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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
EDDY N. BETENSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CALL AUTO & EQUIPMENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Defendants-Respondent.
CASE NO. 17600
EUGENE L. LOWIN and GENEVA
LOWIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CALL AUTO & EQUIPMENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Defendants-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a consolidation of two actions, alleging breach
of contract, fraud, and violation of state securities laws
brought by investors in a heavy equipment business.

With

respect to Respondent Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (hereinafter "Fireman's Fund"), the actions are for recovery under
a motor vehicle dealer's bond.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted respondent's motions to dismiss
and denied appellants' motions for reconsideration or modification.

No judgments have been entered by the lower court

with respect to any defendants other than respondent Fireman's
Fund.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks

to have this Court affirm the final

judgments entered by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants allege defendants Call Auto & Equipment Sales,
Inc., Call Call, Inc. and Barlow Enterprises, Inc. were

eng~~

in the business of purchasing, refurbishing and selling heavy
construction equipment.

They further allege defendants Elroy

Barlow, Timothy Barlow, Elroy Barlow, Jr. and L. A. Campbell
were officers, directors and shareholders of the corporate
defendants and "dominated and controlled the corporate defendants such that the corporate defendants were merely their
alter-ego, and the separate entity of the corporations should
be disregarded

" (R. 3)1

1As stated in footnote 2, page 2 of Appellants' Brief, the
allegations of the complaints in the two actions, insofar
as relevant to these appeals, are the same. All cites are
to the Betenson record, unless the Lowin record is expressly designated.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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During 1979 and 1980, defendant Elroy Barlow allegedly
solicited appellants to invest money with said defendants.
(R. 4)

The basis of their investments is set forth in para-

graph seven of the Betenson Complaint as follows:
In or about August 1979 defendant Elroy T. Barlow,
acting on behalf of all defendants, solicited plaintiff
Betenson for the purpose of raising funds for the corporate defendants. At that time, said defendant represented to Betenson that defendants were engaged in the
business of purchasing, refurbishing and selling heavy
construction equipment and were in immediate need of
funds to purchase certain equipment which could be refurbished and sold at substantial profits. Said defendant represented to Betenson that if he would invest
funds for a joint venture to purchase, refurbish and
sell such equipment, that such investment would at all
times be fully secured by various personal property
and equipment of the corporate defendants and that
Betenson would receive a guaranteed profit for his
investment. (R. 3).
Each investment was represented by a written agreement.
The written agreements were identical in form; copies are
attached as Exhibits A, B,

c,

D, F, G, and H to the Betenson
2
Complaint and Exhibit A to the Lowin Complaint.
The agreements provide in pertinent part:

2Exhibit F is alleged in paragraph 39 of the Betenson Complaint, but the exhibit is not attached to the complaint
contained in the record.
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WHEREAS, SECOND PARTY has approached first party
for the purpose of entering into an investment in their
business as a type of joint venture, and:
WHEREAS, each of the parties have obtained independent legal counsel and are fully aware of this business
transaction:

* * * *
1.
FIRST PARTY herewith pays over to SECOND PARTY
the sum of $
cash to be used by SECOND
PARTY in buying and selling various types of personal
property and equipment at a profit in its business.
2.
SECOND PARTY agrees and guarantees to pay
over to the FIRST PARTY, as his or her share of the
profits and investment, the following sums of money
on the following dates: • • • (R. 20)
The agreements further provide that the investments
are to be secured by personal property and equipment, but
that such property can be dealt with at a profit by the defendants if they deem it expedient and proper.

Each agree-

ment also contains a renewal clause, continuing the investments under the same terms for specified periods of time if
the parties so wish.
Appellants allege breach of contract, fraud and a violation of state securities laws with respect to each of the
agreements, and specifically allege that they entered into
the agreements and invested their money in reliance on the
representations of defendant Elroy Barlow set forth in paragraph 7 of the Betenson Complaint.
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Appellants' claim against Respondent Fireman's Fund is
based on a motor vehicle dealer's bond which it issued to
defendant Call Auto.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS WERE PARTICIPANTS IN A JOINT
VENTURE WITH DEFENDANTS AND THEREFORE
CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST THE DEALER'S BOND
Appellants rely on Section 41-3-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953),
as amended, for their c:ause of action against respondent.
This section provides a cause of action against motor vehicle
dealers and their sureties in favor of persons damaged by
reason of the dealer's fraud or violation of the provisions
of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act.
The trial court held the right of action provided in
§41-3-18 does not apply to appellants because they were engaged in a joint venture with the defendants.
is supported by Utah case law.

This ruling

In Bates v. Simpson, 121

Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952) this court impliedly held that
a joint venturer with the principal on a dealer's bond cannot recover against the bond.

The reasoning of ~· and

of the trial court in this case, is sound.

The dealer's

bond statutes are intended only to protect members of the
public who deal with the dealer in a commercial capacity.
To allow a joint venturer to recover against the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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principal's bond allows the joint venturer, in essence, to
recover against his own bond.
Appellants concede they are not entitled to recover
against the bond if their relationships with defendants were
joint ventures, but argue their transactions with defendants
were loans.

The issue before this court on appeal is whether

the lower court erred in finding as a matter of law that
appellants' agreements with defendants were joint ventures
rather than loans.

The. trial court's ruling was correct

and should be affirmed for the following reasons:
A.

Appellants Have Judicially Admitted They Were
Joint Venturers.

Appellants, by their own admissions, were engaged in
joint ventures with the defendants.

In paragraph 7 of the

Betenson Complaint, appellants allege:
Said defendant represented to Betenson that if he would
invest funds for a joint venture to purchase, reburbish
and sell such equipment, • • • Betenson would receive
a guaranteed profit for his investment.
(R. 3).
In paragraph 8 of the Betenson complaint, appellents
allege that the investments alleged in the complaints, as
represented by the agreements attached as exhibits to the
complaints, were made "in reliance upon such representations".
Accordingly, appellants admit they made their investments
and signed the agreements with the understanding that they
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would be engaged in a joint venture with the defendants
to purchase, refurbish and sell equipment to make a profit.
The allegations of joint ventures in the complaints
are binding judicial admissions and appellants cannot now
assert a position directly contrary to their pleadings.
As stated in 4 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) 45, Sl064:
The pleadings in a cause are, for the purposes of the
use in that suit, not mere ordinary admissions • • •
but judicial admissions, •• • : i.e., they are not means
of evidence, but a waiver of all controversy (so far
as the opponent may~esire to take advantage of them)
and therefore a limitation of the issues.
The principle stated by Wigmore regarding judicial admissions in pleadings has been applied by this court.

In

Estate of Clarence Henry McFarland v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127,
417 P.2d 244 (1966), the executrix under a will sought to
set aside an order confirming the sale of real property which
had been entered pursuant to her own petition.

The lower

court denied the motion and this court affirmed, holding:
One who files a pleading asking the court to act thereon vouches for its verity and should not thereafter be
permitted to repudiate it for the purpose of.upsetting
the action the court has taken pursuant to his request.
Id. at 245.
Other jurisdictions have also applied this principle.
In Myers v. Carter, 556 P.2d 703, (Or. 1976) the trial court
was reversed for submitting an issue to the jury which was
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admitted in a letter attached to and incorporated in the
plaintiff's complaint.

The Oregon court held:

Statements contained in the pleadings are considered
conclusive judicial admissions.
(Citations omitted)
Thus, whatever evidence may have been adduced at trial
the facts contained in that letter are conclusively
'
established. Id. at 707.
As stated in the above authorities, plaintiffs' allegations of joint ventures in their pleadings are not merely
evidence which they may now refute with contrary claims, but
are admissions which remove all controversy as to the relationship between appellants and the defendants.

Based on

appellants own pleadings there is no issue to be determined
by the court or submitted to a jury concerning the relationships between appellants and defendants.

It is conclusively

established by appellants' judicial admissions that the relationship between the parties was that of joint venturers.
B.

Appellants Are Bound by the Terms of the Written
Agreements.

Appellants contend that although the written agreements
expressly provide for a joint venture, they should be allowed
to introduce evidence that the parties to the agreements intended otherwise.

Appellants recite several factual allega-

tions in their brief attempting to show intent contrary to
the express provisions of the agreements.
pp. 16-17)

(Appellants' Brief,

They also cite the cases of Bender v. Bender,

-8-
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397 P.2d 957 (Mont. 1965),

Porter v. Moore, 300 P.2d 513

(Mont. 1956) and Vineland Hornes v. Barish, 292 P.2d 941 (Cal.
App. 1956) in support of their argument that the intent of
the parties rather than the express provisions of the written
agreements should govern.

Each of those cases is distinguish-

able from the factual setting presented by this appeal.
Bender and Porter involve disputes between the parties to
the alleged partnership agreement.

Vineland Hornes involves

an oral partnership agreement, the terms and existence of
which must, of necessify, be proved by parol evidence.
In this case, respondent is not a party to the written
agreements executed by appellant which created the joint
ventures.

Although the intention of the parties to a contract

may govern their contractual relationship, as to third parties the express language of the contract governs.

~

Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 1110 (Ariz. App. 1973)1
Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833 (Idaho 1952)1 Lepel v.
Lepel, 456 P.2d 249 (Idaho 1969).
In James Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, supra, plaintiffs Hansen and Cherokee Construction Company were involved in several
real estate transactions.

Cherokee deeded property to Han-

sen, who obtained financing to build thereon.

Hansen deeded

the property back to Cherokee, which started construction
and contracted with Weller to perform dry wall and paint-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing work.

After construction was completed, Cherokee deeded

the property back to Hansen.

Subsequently, Weller filed a

mechanics lien, naming Cherokee as owner.

Cherokee received

timely notice, but Hansen did not receive notice of the lien
until three months later.

After receiving notice of the

lien, Hansen brought an action against Weller to quiet title
and Weller counterclaimed to foreclose its lien.

Hansen

defended the counterclaim on the grounds that he had not
received proper and timely notice of the lien.

Weller con-

tended that a joint venture existed between Hansen and Cherekee and the notice to Cherokee was therefore adequate notice
to Hansen.

The lower court granted judgment to Hansen, but

the Appellate Court reversed, holding that a joint venture
did exist as to Weller, a third party.

The court stated:

While the intent of the parties is essential as between
the parties, where there is a clear and unambiguous
contract, as here, the contract controls as to Weller,
a third party.

*

*

*

*

The intent of the contracting parties to
form a partnership is always an essential element of a
partnership relation as between the parties themselves,
but as to third parties, the relation will b7 determined from the facts rather than the conclusions of
the co-partners as to the nature of their business
relationship.
Id., 517 P.2d at 1114-15, citing Mercer v. Vinson, 336 P.2d
854, 858 (Ariz. 1959).

-10-
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The agreements in the present case are consistent and
unambiguous.

They expressly provide that the purpose of

the agreements is "entering into an investment • • • as a
type of joint venture."

Consistent with that purpose the

agreements provide that the investments are to be used "in
buying and selling various types of personal property and
equipment at a profit" and that appellants are to receive
certain payments "as his or her share of the profits and
investment."

There is no uncertainty or ambiguity on the

face of the agreements as to the nature of the relationship
between the parties thereto.

Accordingly, as to third par-

ties such as respondent, appellants are bound by the express
provisions of the agreements which they voluntarily signed
while being represented and advised by counsel.
It is apparent from the agreements that particular care
was taken in structuring the transactions and drafting the
agreements as joint ventures so as to avoid the appearance
of a loan.

The terms "joint venture," "investments" and

"profits" were specifically used in the agreements and terms
such as loan, debt, note and interest are noticeably absent
in the agreements.

Although appellants' brief alleges notes

were signed "in some cases," according to the pleadings a
note was signed in connection with the agreements in only
one instance.

In that case, the note does not conform to

_,,_
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the agreement with respect to the dollar amount and the
interest rate is conspicuously left blank.

(R. 26-28).

The reasons the agreements specify joint ventures rather
than loans are not totally clear from the record, but it is
significant that the agreements, if deemed loans, would provide interest rates ranging from 30% to 120% per annum.
Whatever the reasons for establishing joint ventures rather
than loans, the written agreements are clear and unambiguous
and govern as to third

pa~ties

such as respondent.

POINT II
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO LEAVE TO
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS AND THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
After the trial court entered the orders dismissing
the complaints, appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration
or Modification of Order Granting Motion to Dismiss.

The

trial court's denial of that motion was correct and should
be affirmed for the following reasons:
A.

Leave to Amend the Complaints was Not Timely
Sought.

Appellants did not move for leave to amend their complaints prior to entry of the orders of dismissal.

AppellanU

have never filed a proper motion for leave to amend the
complaints.

Nevertheless their Motions for Reconsideration

state as a ground for the motions that they are entitled to
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amend the complaints.

This court has twice held that leave

to amend a complaint will not be granted after an action
has been dismissed.

Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah

1976)i Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972).
In Nichols v. State, supra, the plaintiff filed a motion
for leave to amend her complaint after the defendants' motion
to dismiss had been granted.

The trial court denied the

motion for leave to amend and this court affirmed, holding:
Utah has adopted the majority rule that an
order of dismissa~ is a final adjudication, and
thereafter, a plaintiff may not file an amended
complaint. Id. at 232.
Assuming, arguendo, appellants' motion for reconsideration is considered a motion for leave to amend, it was not
timely and the trial court was correct in denying the motion.
B.

Appellants' Motions for Reconsideration Are Not
Proper Motions.

After entry of the orders dismissing their complaints,
appellants filed Motions for Reconsideration on the alleged
grounds that substantial evidence and authorities existed
which had not been brought to the attention of the trial
court.

The motions did not purport to be made pursuant to

Rules 59 or 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and none of
the grounds for post-judgment relief under those rules were
asserted.
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In Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662
(1966) the district court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in an automobile accident case.

Two months later

the judge granted defendants' motion for new trial.

The

plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider and set aside
the order granting new trial.

That motion was granted and

the original judgment reinstated by the trial court.

On

appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case to the
trial court for a new trial, holding:
It is signlfidant that our Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for the trial court
to reconsider or to review its ruling. • •
Undoubtedly
this is advisedly so • •
When this has been done and the court has ruled
upon the motion, if the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself,
the question arises, why should not the other party
who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion
for re-re-consideration, asking the court to again
reverse himself?
In order to avoid such a state of indecision for both
the judge and the parties, practical expediency demands
that there be some finality to the actions of the court,
and he should not be in the position of having the further duty of acting as a court of review upon his own
ruling.
Id. 415 P.2d at 663-64.
Although the trial court did hear appellants' motions
for reconsideration, before denying them, it could have properly denied the motions without hearing.

-14-
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C.

Appellants' Proposed Amendments Would Directly
Contradict Their Original Pleadings Which Are
Judicial Admissions.
'

Appellants argue they should be granted leave to amend
their complaints to allege that the transactions between
them and defendants were loans and not joint ventures.

This

is not a case of appellants having merely omitted an allegation essential to state a claim.

Appellants pled the trans-

actions as joint ventures and submitted the matter for decision to the lower court upon the premise that a joint venturer is entitled to recover against a dealer's bond.

By

the trial court's decision, appellants discovered they were
not entitled to recover against respondent based on the facts
pled.

Failing there, appellants now want to change horses

in midstream.

They now argue they should have been allowed

to amend their complaints to plead facts in direct contradiction to the facts pled in their original complaints.
The granting or denying of leave to amend is a matter
within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will
be reversed only upon a finding that it abused its discretion.
Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980)1 Department of
Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980)1 Hoover
Equipment Co. v. Smith, 198 Kan. 127, 422 P.2d 914 (1967).
The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellants leave to amend their complaints to plead
facts directly contrary to their prior admissions.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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D.

Even if Appellants Had Been Granted Leave to
Amend Their Complaints to Allege Loans Rather
Than Joint Ventures, They Would Not Be Entitled
to Recover Against the Dealer's Bond Because
the Transactions, If Loans, Were Illegal and
Unconscionable.

Under the Utah enactment of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, S70B-3-602(1) Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, appellants' agreements with the defendants, if deemed loans, would
be consumer related loans.

Consumer-related loans to persons

other than organizations are usurious and illegal if the
finance charge exceeds J8%.

S70B-3-201(1) and S70B-3-602(2).

Appellants allege that the individual defendants, at all
relevant times, dominated and controlled the corporate defendants such that the corporate defendants were merely their
alter-ego and the separate entity of the corporations should
be disregarded in this action.

(R. 2, 3).

Based on the agreements incorporated in the complaints,
appellants were to receive interest at the following rates
if the transactions are deemed loans:
Eddie N. Betenson
120% per annum on $7,000 - Exhibit A to Betenson
Complaint
60% per annum on $10,000 - Exhibit B to Betenson
Complaint
60% per annum on $2,000 - Exhibit C to Betenson
Complaint
Gregory Johnson
120% per annum on $900 - Exhibit D to Betenson
Complaint
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Alice Adams
60% per annum on $2,000 - No exhibit
Randall Adams
60% per annum on $6,000 - Exhibit G to Betenson
Complaint
45% per annum on $10,000 - Exhibit H to Betenson
Complaint
Eugene and Genevia Lowin
30% per annum on $30,000 - Exhibit A to Lowin
Complaint
Usurious loans are void and unenforceable.

Ross v.

Producers Mutual Insurance Co., 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339
(1956).

See also §70B-_5...;301, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as

amended, which makes it a misdemeanor to willfully charge
more than the usury limit.
Since appellants' agreements with defendants, if deemed
loans, are unenforceable, appellants would have no right to
recover against the bond.

Otherwise, appellants would bene-

fit from their own illegal acts.

Furthermore, respondent,

as surety, cannot be held liable on the basis of a transaction or obligation which cannot be enforced against its
principal.

Accordingly, the trial court was correct in not

allowing appellants to amend the complaints to allege their
agreements were loans rather than joint ventures.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling that appellants were engaged
in joint ventures and are therefore not entitled to recover
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against the bond was correct and should be affirmed for two
reasons:
1.

Appellants admitted in their pleadings that they

invested money in joint ventures with the defendants.

These

allegations in the complaints constitute judicial admissions.
Accordingly, there was no issue before the trial court as
to the nature of the relationships between appellants and
the defendants and the court properly applied the law to
the facts as established :by appellants' own pleadings.
2.

The written a-greements between appellants and the

defendants were placed before the court by appellants.

Tho~

documents expressly provide, without ambiguity, that the
agreements between appellants and the defendants are joint
ventures and not loans.

As to third parties such as respon-

dent, the terms of the written agreements govern and appellants are not entitled to contradict those terms by extrinsic evidence of their intent.
The trial court properly denied appellants' motion for
reconsideration for the following reasons:
1.

To the extent appellants were requesting leave to

amend their complaints by the motion for reconsideration,
their request was untimely.

Leave to amend a complaint can-

not be granted after the complaint has been dismissed.
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2.

Motions to reconsider are not recognized under

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and this court has expressly
held that such motions are improper.
3.

Appellants' proposed amendments would directly

contradict the judicial admissions made in their original
complaints.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to allow appellants to amend their complaints
to plead facts directly contrary to facts already admitted.
4.

Appellants'

ag~eements

with the defendants, if

deemed loans rather than joint ventures, were usurious and
illegal.

It is no wonder such care was taken in the draft-

ing of the agreements between appellants and defendants to
avoid the appearance of loans, in view of the fact that the
interest rates would have been up to 120% per annum.
DATED this

22.icl day of July, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
\

By

By

))c;__ / d tu,!/s-

Dav id G.rwilliams

©,u<<Y!;Pvi~
Bruce H. Jensel) /
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the within Brief of Respondent to Stephen B. Mitchell, at Burbidge, Mabey
& Mitchell, Attorneys for Appellant, at 438 East 200 South, Suite
1, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid in the United
States Mail, this

=~nJ

day of July, 1981.

-- Bruce JenseJ9
Attorney for Respondent
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